variance of the normal truncated above 1.96 is .14, the test z comparing 2.77 to 2.34 is 7.56 (.43 divided by (. 14/37) 1/2 ). p is virtually 0. Similar results are found with cut points of 1.65, 2.33, and 2.58.
Unfortunately, the results counterindicate going "backwards" from the hypothesized tail to infer the location of the hypothesized mean. The reason is that all the variances of the zs actually computed are four to six times larger than those based on normal curve theory. All we can do is reject-soundly-the null hypothesis, without introducing the "small enough" ambiguity of the Rosenthal method. The discrepancy between theoretical and observed variances mitigates against any normal curve "correction" of effect size.
Sampling independent zs above 1.96 thus led to a mean very significantly larger than 2.34, the expected value if we were sampling zs above 1.96 from a unit normal distribution. Our conclusion is that we are not randomly sampling from a truncated normal. Specifically, the zs are larger. The significant effects of psychotherapy cannot be accounted for by selective reporting unless there is an additional bias that the larger the z beyond the standard significance level the more likely it is to be reported. If such a bias existed, we would expect the results above 2.58 to be nonexistent, or at least weaker than those above 1.96. But they are not (test z = 7.42, p virtually 0).
Our basic assumption is quite broad. In fact, when c approaches -oo, it is the standard assumption underlying normal distribution significance tests. All we have done is to apply the same logic to a (truncated) part of that distribution.
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The usual procedure for research on the psychology of judgment and decision making consists of presenting subjects with a task for which some model from logic, probability theory, or the like prescribes a "correct" answer. The existence of a discrepancy between a subject's answer and the prescriptions of the model, and the size of that discrepancy, defines the adequacy of the judgmental or decision performance.
As one might expect, there usually is a discrepancy between what the subject does and what the model prescribes. The question is how large that discrepancy has to be before one concludes that the subject's performance is inadequate. In many cases, such conclusions depend a good deal on how the experimenter elects to interpret the data. As a result, the conclusions contained in the literature are quite mixed.
There are numerous examples of poor performance (Fischhoif, 1975; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) , but there are also cases of good performance (Christensen-Szalanski, Diehr, Bushyhead, & Wood, 1982; Muchinsky & Fitch, 1975; Phelps & Shanteau, 1978) , as well as cases in which it is difficult to really know (Bar-Hillel, 1979; Thorngate, 1980 ; see also Loftus & Beach, 1982; Christensen-Szalanski, in press ).
The problem is that if one were to examine summaries of this research, either comprehensive summaries (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) or the introductions to journal articles, one would receive the distinct impression that the literature is not mixed at all, that the findings clearly show human judgment and decision making to be hopelessly inadequate. The unfortunate result of this is that persons who rely on such summaries and who do not closely examine the research and results, tend to accept the negative pronouncements as fact and to generalize them without hesitation (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982) .
It is our hypothesis that the widely held belief in the hopelessness of human judgment and decision performance results in part from the fact that only evidence to that effect gets much attention. That is, evidence for poor performance is cited more frequently than is evidence for good performance.
In the spirit of egocentric biases, the availability bias, the hindsight bias, the anchoring bias, and all the rest, we shall call selectivity in the citing of evidence the citation bias. 1 In what follows, we provide evidence for the existence of such a bias and examine the possible effects that the bias might have on the views of readers of the literature.
We start by comparing the citation frequencies of a representative set of published articles that reported either good or poor performance. To obtain these sets of articles, each of us separately read all of the more than 3,500 abstracts obtained from a search of Psychological Abstracts using the keywords: decision making, judgment, probability judgment, and problem solving. The search was limited to the 10-year period extending from 1972 through 1981. To be selected, the ar-tides had to be empirical, they had to have been published in an English language journal, the subjects had to have been adult humans, studies of group problem solving were omitted, and the abstracts had to state that the subjects' behavior had been compared with the prescriptions from an explicit model from logic, probability theory, or the like. Each article was classified as having obtained either good or poor performance based on the reported findings. There were 37 good-performance articles and 47 poor-performance articles.
Figure 1
Relationship The Social Science Citation Index was used to obtain the frequency with which each article was cited each year. The "popularity" or "citability" of the 24 different journals in which the articles of our sample were published was ascertained using the Journal Citation Impact Measures (Social Science Citation Index: Journal Reports, 1977) . This measure is correlated with the journal's circulation and is relatively stable over time (Buifardi & Nichols, 1981) .
During the 10 years in question, poor-performance articles were cited significantly more often than goodperformance articles. The mean for the former was 27.8 times, whereas the mean for the latter was 4.7, t(S2) = 2.39, p < .02, a ratio of almost six to one. There was no correlation between the type of article (good vs. poor performance) and the "popularity" of the journals or between the type of article and the year of publication. Thus the observed significant differences in the popularity of the articles cannot be accounted for by these factors.
We next examined whether the citation frequency of poor-and goodperformance articles changed over the years. Figure 1 shows the average citation frequency per article in print for each of the 10 years surveyed. Although both types of articles were cited with increasing frequency in recent years (the slopes of both regression lines are significantly different from zero, p < .01), the citation frequency increased at a significantly greater rate for poorperformance articles than for goodperformance articles (p < .001), demonstrating that the preferential popularity of poor-performance articles has increased markedly in recent years. Figure 2 shows the average number of yearly citations per article in print as a function of how long the article has been in print by two-year intervals. The figure shows that the literature on good performance largely is ignored; the citation frequency remains small and is relatively unaffected by the time the articles have been in print. In contrast, the citation frequency of the poor-performance articles increased greatly with the passage of time.
Because newspaper and scientific journal coverage has been shown to be related to biases in readers' judgments (Christensen-Szalanski, Beck, Christensen-Szalanski, & Koepsell, 1983; Combs & Slovic, 1979; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978) , we decided to examine whether the citation bias in favor of studies reporting poor reasoning performance was reflected in the opinions of those who read the literature. We expected the readers of this literature would think that humans are not very able judges or decision makers. Moreover, because it is a more familiar theme, the readers should be better able to recall documented examples (studies) of poor performance than they can of good performance.
Questionnaires were mailed to 149 United States members of the Judgment and Decision Making Society, a semiformal professional group, who were listed in the group's 1981 directory. Eighty people returned completed questionnaires. We asked the respondents to assess the overall quality of human judgment and decision-making abilities on a scale from 0 to 100 (0 = never optimal, 100 = always optimal), and to list four examples of documented poor judgment or decision-making performance and four examples of good performance. The respondents were divided into three groups representing three levels of research experience. This was based on the number of each person's self-reported publications in the field. Members of the low-experience group (n = 39) had fewer than 5 publications. Members of the medium-experience group (n = 25) had from 5 to 15 publications. Members of the high-experience group (« = 16) had more than 15 publications. The median ratings of the quality of human judgment and decision-making abilities were 45 for the low-experience group, 60 for the medium-experience group, and 65 for the high-experience group (p < .05, Jonckheere test of ordered alternatives).
As expected, an examination of the number of recalled examples of poor and good performance showed that respondents recalled significantly more examples of poor performance than of good performance (Mdn& 4 vs. 1, respectively, p < .001). However, the variety of poor-performance examples was extremely limited. Table 1 lists all responses that were given by at least 10% of the respondents. Eight of these responses accounted for 88% of the poor-performance examples given, whereas all 10 of the responses accounted for only 31% of the good-performance examples given.
Note that all of the examples of poor performance were laboratory studies, usually with college students as subjects. In contrast, only 42% of the examples of good performance were laboratory studies; 58% were done in applied settings and/or used experts as subjects (e.g., livestock judges, weather forecasters, accountants).
In conclusion, these results demonstrate that there is indeed a citation bias in the judgment and decisionmaking literature. They corroborate the claims that studies which observe optimal behavior tend to be ignored in the literature (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982; Cohen, 1981; Lopes, 1981) .
Although our study design does not allow us to demonstrate that the citation bias influenced psychologists' opinions, the results show that a marked similarity exists between the citation bias and how the readers of that literature view human judgment and decision-making abilities. Less experienced researchers in the area appear to have a lower opinion of human reasoning ability than do highly experienced researchers. Perhaps the less experienced researchers are younger and obtained most of their experience only recently when concern about poor reasoning abilities has become so fashionable, or perhaps the more experienced researchers base their views less on what they read and more on their own experience with the vagaries of experimentation and data interpretation. Moreover, respondents recalled half again as many examples of poor performance as of good performance despite the fact that the variety of poorperformance examples was extremely limited. Hammond (1982) recently called for psychologists to be more balanced in their approach to understanding human judgment and decision-making abilities. It would appear from the results of this study that Hammond's call might best be heeded. Although the study of reasoning errors can advance our understanding of reasoning processes , so too can the study of good judgment (Christensen-Szalanski, 1978; Lopes, 1981; Lopes & Ekberg, 1980; Rachlin, Battalio, Kagel, & Green, 1981) .
We do not believe that an editorial conspiracy has caused the citation bias. The nonsignificant correlation between type of study and citability of journal implies that good-and poor-performance articles are being published in the same or comparable journals, and there is not much difference in the proportions of each (44% and 56%, respectively). The poor-performance articles are just receiving most of the attention from other writers.
There probably are many reasons why this citation bias exists. For example, authors select citations to serve their personal goals (May, 1967) or to advocate their favored hypothesis (Armstrong, 1979) , and readers overrate the results of prominent investigators (Owen, 1982) . Sadly, scientific research is not immune to fads and fashions that result in a few hot topics getting the most attention (Armstrong, Boor, 1982; Dunnette, 1966; Thorne, 1977) .
In addition to these problems, which are common to all academic disciplines, we think that there may be something else that is specific to research that involves reasoning. When people behave the way they are "supposed to," it often does not seem particularly remarkable. But when people behave in what appears to be an irrational manner, it is not only remarkable, but we can give it a name. Names like representativeness, availability bias, and overconfidence bias make the unfelicitous performance seem like a concrete phenomenon and create the illusion that we have actually explained something merely by naming it (Anderson, 1974) . Psychology is full of names for various performance problems, and of late these seem to get labeled the something-or-other bias. Since the label bias is such an eyecatching term, perhaps to draw more attention to people's good performance, we should label that good performance the "hats off" bias.
